Cleaning House: Contamination & Decon of PPE & Building Environments
CLEAN Lessons Learned
Cleaning House: Contamination & Decon of PPE & Building Environments
In this special session of the CLEAN Lessons Learned series, Cleaning House: Contamination & Decontamination of PPE & Building Environments explored the challenges of managing biological and radiological contamination in personal protective equipment (PPE) and indoor environments. Bringing together experts in occupational health, respiratory protection, environmental engineering, and radiological response, the session examined how contamination can be assessed, controlled, and safely removed while protecting workers, building occupants, and the wider public.
The presentations addressed several critical aspects of decontamination and preparedness. Ed Fisher of NIOSH shared research on the decontamination, extended use, and reuse of N95 filtering facepiece respirators, highlighting the importance of preserving both filtration efficiency and fit. Selcen Kilinc-Balci presented findings on how disinfecting wipes can affect the liquid-barrier performance of protective clothing, demonstrating why PPE that looks clean may not necessarily retain its original protective capabilities. Bryon Marsh discussed radiological contamination, including detection, removal, responder protection, and the challenges of preventing contamination from spreading beyond an affected area. Ken Martinez drew on lessons from the 2001 anthrax attacks and subsequent building decontamination efforts to examine environmental sampling, remediation strategies, and the criteria used to determine when contaminated buildings can be safely reoccupied.
Together, these discussions emphasized that effective decontamination requires more than selecting a cleaning product or treatment technology. It depends on understanding the contaminant, the material being treated, the conditions of exposure, and the effectiveness of the process. Watch the recording or read the transcript to explore the research, real-world response experiences, and practical lessons that can help organizations strengthen contamination control and prepare for future emergencies.
- Decontamination Must Preserve PPE Performance: Ed Fisher’s research demonstrated that some methods can reduce pathogen contamination while preserving respirator fit and filtration. However, results depend on the specific decontamination method and respirator model. A treatment that works for one respirator cannot automatically be assumed effective for another.
- Respirator Reuse Has Important Limitations: Research involving 412 healthcare workers across six emergency departments found that nearly 40% of respirators failed fit testing after just one shift of extended use or reuse. Filtration performance also declined. These findings highlight the finite usable life of disposable respirators and the importance of considering reusable alternatives, such as elastomeric respirators and powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs), in emergency supply planning.
- Cleaning PPE Does Not Guarantee That It Remains Protective: Selcen Kilinc-Balci’s research showed that disinfecting wipes can reduce the liquid-barrier performance of certain protective clothing materials. The impact varied according to fabric construction and wipe chemistry, demonstrating that a garment’s appearance alone cannot establish whether it remains safe to use.
- Drying Does Not Necessarily Restore Protective Performance: Allowing protective clothing to dry after wiping did not consistently restore its original liquid-barrier properties. Organizations should evaluate the complete cleaning process—including the PPE model, wipe product, application method, drying conditions, and number of cleaning cycles—before establishing reuse procedures.
- Radiological Decontamination Requires Physical Removal: Bryon Marsh explained that radiological contamination differs from biological and chemical contamination because it cannot simply be neutralized with a disinfectant. It must be physically removed. Effective response depends on appropriate detection equipment, contamination surveys, proper PPE removal, and methods to prevent contaminated material from spreading.
- Preventing Secondary Contamination Is Critical: During large-scale radiological incidents, contamination can travel beyond the original affected area through people, clothing, vehicles, and other surfaces. Understanding where radioactive material is located, how it may move or become airborne again, and how it can be transferred is essential to protecting the public and emergency responders.
- Building Decontamination Requires Evidence and Validation: Ken Martinez shared lessons from the 2001 anthrax attacks, including the use of environmental sampling, chlorine dioxide, vaporized hydrogen peroxide, bleach, and other remediation approaches. He highlighted the importance of establishing measurable decontamination criteria, collecting appropriate samples, and evaluating whether viable contamination remains before making decisions about reoccupancy.
- HVAC Systems Can Play a Role in Building-Wide Decontamination: The discussion highlighted how ventilation systems can distribute decontamination agents throughout a building. However, when biological or radiological contaminants enter HVAC systems, their potential movement and persistence must also be considered. The appropriate response depends on the contaminant, the extent of contamination, and the system’s condition.
- Disinfection Technologies Must Be Evaluated Under Realistic Conditions: The effectiveness of treatments such as ultraviolet (UV) systems depends on factors including dose, exposure time, and the organism or material being treated. For HVAC applications, maintenance and verification are also essential. Technology alone does not guarantee effective decontamination.
- Risk Assessment Requires an Interdisciplinary Approach: Across the presentations, speakers emphasized the need to understand the hazard, dose-response relationship, and exposure pathways before selecting a response strategy. Medical interventions, environmental controls, appropriate PPE, validated sampling, and clear public communication must work together to reduce risk.
- Preparedness Must Happen Before an Emergency: A recurring message was that organizations should establish and validate decontamination procedures before supply shortages or contamination events occur. This includes understanding manufacturer guidance, evaluating compatible cleaning methods, planning for reusable PPE, identifying response responsibilities, and establishing clear criteria for safe reoccupation.
- Clear Communication and Collaboration Strengthen Response Efforts: Whether addressing biological or radiological contamination, responders must communicate reliable information early and coordinate across scientific, public health, environmental, and emergency management disciplines. As the speakers emphasized, there is no single solution for every contaminant or situation; effective response depends on evidence, collaboration, and context.

Angela Weber, MS
IBEC Executive Board, Treasurer
Angela Weber is a health scientist and industrial hygienist who dedicated 33 years to occupational and public health service at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Over that time, she was involved in a variety of emergency preparedness and response efforts addressing infectious disease outbreaks, the development of public health response guidance to BioWatch detections, laboratory exposure assessments, occupational hazards associated with natural disasters, as well as chemical and radiological planning activities. She also advised on the development of biological sampling and analytical methods, data interpretation, and participated in the evaluation of hazards identified during emergency responses such as the World Trade Center attack, the 2002-2004 SARS outbreak, multiple anthrax and ricin incidents, 2013-2016 West Africa Ebola outbreak, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the avian influenza outbreak in U.S. dairy cattle. Her last position with CDC was as the Program Coordinator and founding member of the NIOSH Disaster Science Responder Research Program in the Emergency Preparedness and Response Office.
Today, Ms. Weber uses her expertise to advise on bioaerosol-related matters, lead interdisciplinary research teams, and support emergency preparedness and response activities. She also contributes to IBEC’s nonprofit mission as an Executive Board Member.
She earned her Masters of Science Degree from the University of Cincinnati’s Environmental Health Department in the College of Medicine where she focused her research efforts on bioaerosol challenge testing of respiratory protection devices used by healthcare workers.

Brett Cole
Managing Director / Chief Occupational Hygienist, Biosafety International
Brett is Managing Director/Chief Occupational Hygienist – Biosafety International/Member of Indoor Air Quality Association of Australia and Education & Training Committee (ETC) of Association for Biosafety for Australia and New Zealand.
Brett has been working in contamination control/hygiene in the High containment, Life Sciences, Healthcare, and Food/Beverage Market for over 20 years. His formal qualifications are in Environmental Microbiology & Chemistry and later in Occupational Hygiene and Toxicology.
His experience has been in Academic microbiological research, Medical device High-Level Disinfection, Engineering controls for contamination control in the built environment, materials handling, infectious and contaminated waste and facility microbial testing, decontamination, and remediation.
He has worked in Australia, New Zealand, Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific on many contamination projects from Beta-lactam site remediation for the Pfizer Vaccine Development, Research Animal Facility Infection, Pharmaceutical decontamination, Mould Infestation, Biological Contaminated Building decontamination.
In 2018, Brett wrote and presented the training material for the Safe use of Biological Safety Cabinets for the International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA) and is a Certified Biorisk and Biowaste Professional with IFBA. He is also the lead Biosafety & Biosecurity Consultant to the PNG HIV and Malaria High Containment Facility in Port Moresby.
During the COVID-19 Pandemic, he has worked with two Federal Government Task Forces on PPE and Ventilators, IAQA Guidelines for Validation of Virally contaminated buildings as well as being the first International Contributor to a Technical Working Group on Decontamination for COVID-19 and a founding Contributor of IBEC.

Edward Fisher, MS
Biologist, National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory, NIOSH-CDC
Edward Fisher received his MS in Biology from Duquesne University. He has worked with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), part of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), since 2006 and is currently a biologist in the Research Branch of the National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL).
His research focuses on the performance and use of personal protective equipment (PPE), particularly filtering facepiece respirators, medical examination gloves, and eye and face protection. His work has examined respirator contamination, extended use and reuse of N95 respirators, decontamination, transfer of infectious agents from contaminated PPE, and the ability of PPE to protect workers from biological and chemical hazards.
Much of his early research at NIOSH focused on understanding the risks associated with contaminated N95 respirators and evaluating approaches for their decontamination and reuse. His research has since expanded to include laboratory and field studies of PPE performance and use in healthcare and other occupational settings. He has also contributed to NIOSH research and public health response activities involving influenza, Ebola, opioids, and COVID-19.

Selcen Kilinc-Balci, PhD
Senior Research Engineer, NIOSH-CDC
Selcen Kilinc-Balci brings more than 25 years of experience in personal protective equipment (PPE), with expertise spanning private industry and federal research. Since joining NIOSH in 2010, she has led and contributed to research on PPE performance, testing and evaluation, comfort, standards development, and regulatory requirements.
Dr. Kilinc-Balci has contributed to CDC PPE research, guidance, and response efforts for major public health emergencies, including avian influenza and Ebola, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic. She has also served on advisory groups and workgroups supporting international organizations and U.S. public health initiatives. She is actively involved in standards development through ASTM International, ISO, AAMI, NFPA, and AATCC.
She holds a Ph.D. in Polymer and Fiber Engineering from Auburn University and serves as Co-Chair of the AAMI Protective Barriers Committee and Secretary of F23.40 Biological, within ASTM Committee F23 on Personal Protective Clothing and Equipment.

Kenneth Martinez, MS, CIH
IBEC President
Certified Industrial Hygienist and Environmental Engineer with experience in leading and conducting large-scale research; managing programs in occupational safety and health, and emergency response; and creating and teaching professional development courses. Brings 33 years of CDC expertise in hazardous agent exposure characterization and mitigation control practices in the manufacturing and healthcare industry. Recognized subject matter expert in biological agents including infectious disease and bioterrorism agents. Over a nine-year period for CDC, served in numerous emergency response field leadership roles including the World Trade Center collapse, anthrax, SARS, multi-drug resistant TB, hurricane emergency responses (Katrina and Wilma) and the Deep-Water Horizon oil spill. As a subject matter expert on biological threat agents, provided counsel and leadership to senior management of other federal agencies including providing testimony before a congressional sub-committee on Capitol Hill, presenting before senior leaders of the OSTP, GAO, USPS, DHS, EPA, and FBI and serving on a CDC team tasked to provide responses and a strategic plan to the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA). During 2009, the H1N1 pandemic, coordinated and directed education through media communication to over 600 Cincinnati NIOSH staff. Research efforts in bioaerosols have resulted in 38 peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters; 32 NIOSH technical reports; over 100 technical presentations at scientific meetings; and courses on bioaerosols targeted at the local, state, and national level. From 2013 to 2020, he supported DHS as a contractor for a national airborne biodetection system serving as a Jurisdictional Coordinator for two jurisdictions, as an Environmental Assessment (EA) team lead and as a Field Operations team lead. Subsequently, he provided contract support to FEMA CBRN and FDA. From 2020-2024, he served as a Senior Critical Infrastructure Analyst for Idaho National Laboratory. From 2021-2024, he served as an Adjunct Professor at the Edith Cowan University, School of Medical and Health Sciences in Australia. He currently operates as the President for a non-profit (Integrated Bioscience and the Built Environment Consortium – IBEC) created to provide support of COVID-19 pandemic response efforts nationally.

Bryon Marsh, MPH, MHS
CBRN Program Development and Technical Relationship Manager, Savannah River National Laboratory
Bryon Marsh is a retired U.S. Army Environmental Science and Engineering Officer with 25 years of experience in the CBRN response mission space. Bryon’s assignments included serving as an Army Ranger in the 75th Ranger Regiment, as a paratrooper with the 3/325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team, and H Company 121st Infantry Long-Range Surveillance (LRS) as a Team Leader to operate in small, intelligence gathering teams behind enemy lines. His last assignment to the 4th WMD – Civil Support Team program included managing an ISO 17025 mobile laboratory for on-site analytical support during domestic CBRN response incidents. Bryon received his MPH from Emory University and his MHS from the Naval Post Graduate School. He previously spent the last 10 years supporting CBRN capability development as a program development leader and Principal Investigator at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratory and is now currently working at the Savannah River National Laboratory.
Kenneth Martinez 0:10
Hello, and thank you for joining us here today. My name is Ken Martinez. I am the president of the Integrated Bioscience and Built Environment Consortium. We are a non-profit that stood up during the early days of COVID.
We did so to help communicate messages about what one can do in the built environment to help mitigate the airborne infectious diseases. We like to profess that we understand people, buildings, and pathogens.
We weave together disparate technical disciplines and knowledge spheres to provide real-world solutions for transmission reduction.
We have 3 areas of focus, buildings and the environmental systems, human and social systems, and environmental microbiology.
The problem is that people need to feel safe gathering in indoor spaces, and information is coming from all sides. Science is dynamic and complex, too much guidance at too high of a level, and it lacks… there’s a lack of confidence that environmental transmission is real and controllable.
So, we entered into that space back in 2020. We have a broad science advisory board that includes health behavioral scientists, engineers, industrial hygienists, doctors, and many other disciplines. And we’re very proud that we have that
base of knowledge from which we can draw information. We’ve been doing these Lessons Learned series for approximately 3 years now, to try to educate you on the issues related to airborne infectious diseases, and what you can do in your work environment, in your home environment, in addition to vaccinations.
And, diagnostic testings, which those are still critical, but given that it’s airborne, we want you to have other means of controlling your
microenvironment.
These Lessons Learned webinar series are done in collaboration with the American Industrial Hygiene Association, and so we wanted to give them credit for allowing us to share this information for you. We have two moderators this evening, one of which is Brett Cole.
And the second is Angela Weber. So I’m going to turn it over to them now, as I’m serving as a panelist in this particular webinar series. Brett?
Brett Cole 2:23
Thank you very much, Ken. Appreciate the introduction. Hi everybody, my name’s Brett Cole. I’m coming to you live here from early in the morning in Australia, to guide you through the sessions alongside my American colleague and member of the IBEC Executive Leadership Team, Angela Weber.
Welcome, everybody, to IBEC. It is great to see that the return of the Lessons Learned series, as Ken mentioned, have been running for about 3 years now, and so much has changed over recent months that many of our members have been trying to keep up with developments in the infection prevention space.
While infection agents are airborne, the cycle of them settling and re-aerosolizing creates potential, complex routes of exposure in the built environment. For this reason, today’s title of our session is Cleaning House, Contamination
and decontamination of personal protection equipment and building environments. We will be considering how we keep our workers safe.
and protect our buildings and occupants from microbial and radiological contaminants. Today, we’ll examine how we think about
disinfection and decontamination of PPE used during infectious disease outbreaks, and examine indoor air surface contamination following a biological or radiological release. Today’s seminar will begin with presentations from each of our four speakers, followed by questions and answers session.
Dr. Stephane Bilodeau, IBEC’s Chief Science Officer, will close things out with an update on a variety of recent IBEC activities.
As I mentioned, my name’s Brett Cole, I run a company called Biosafety International, and a environmental microbiologist, industrial hygienist by trade, and we focus on building decontamination
Particularly those in high containment spaces like BSL3 and BSL4 laboratories, healthcare, food and beverage, and pharmaceutical.
I’m also a founding member of IBEC, and have been working with Ken and the team since its inception back in 2020.
I’ll now let Angela, my co-moderator, introduce herself and get things going with our first speaker. Over to you, Angela.
Angela Weber 4:35
Thanks, Brett, and welcome to everyone.
A little bit about my background. I recently retired from CDC last year after 33 years as a health scientist and industrial hygienist, working on occupational and public health challenges associated with the assessment of biological exposures and contamination during infectious disease outbreaks.
I’ve supported large-scale response efforts to such agents as anthrax and ricin contamination, as well as the Ebola outbreaks, COVID-19 pandemic.
And more recently, the avian influenza outbreak.
I’ve also was one of the founding members and helped launch the NIOSH Disaster Science Responder Research Program.
I’m now happy to be putting my experience to use.
by working as an Executive Board member with…
So, as Brett was saying, we’ll start today’s seminar with presentations from four speakers. We did have a fifth speaker who was unable to make it.
Today, due to some delays in flights. As everyone knows, that’s been an issue recently.
Following the presentations, we’ll begin a Q&A session. We’re first going to use a selection of pre-submitted questions.
Afterward, we’ll open the floor to questions from the audience that we’re asking you to submit in the chat.
You can read the full bios for today’s speakers in the meeting announcement, as we’ll save time by only doing a short intro.
So, let’s get started.
I’ll introduce our first speaker.
It’s Mr. Edward Fisher. He is a biologist with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
He works in NIOSH’s National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory, where his research is focused on respirator contamination, extended use and reuse of N95 respirators, and the transfer of infectious agents from contaminated PPE.
I’ll hand it over to Mr. Fisher to share slides and get us started. Thank you.
Edward Fisher 6:56
Thank you, Angela. So, yeah, I’m Ed Fisher, biologist now, I guess a general engineer, with NPPTL.
And today, what I’m gonna talk about is,
Some of our lessons from our work on decontaminating, filtering facepiece respirators, which I’ll also refer to as FFRs.
I’ll cover why we started this work, what makes it difficult.
How we studied it, and what we learned.
So let’s begin with why we started this work.
So in early 2006, the Institute of Medicine, which is now the National Academy of Medicine, estimated that healthcare workers would require more than 90 million FFRs during a 42-day influenza outbreak.
It called for research on simple decontamination methods that preserve respirator integrity to help conserve supplies.
NPPTL launched the FFR Reusability Project at the end of 2006.
The goal of the project was to determine if FFRs could be safely decontaminated for reuse, and to develop the standard methodology to make this determination.
So let’s look at some of the challenges to FFR decontamination.
So, decontamination method has to meet several demands at once. It’s gotta reduce pathogens,
It’s gotta preserve the FFR filtration and fit, it must be safe for the wearer, and work across different models and repeated cycles.
And the respirator’s construction kind of makes that difficult, because, you know, FFRs are disposable devices, and many manufacturers label them as single-use.
There are pores, multi-layer materials, and that can create hard-to-reach areas where pathogens may be shielded from the decontamination treatment.
It has an electret filtering layer, which gives it its… and that relies on an electrostatic charge that makes, you know, that gives its filtration efficiency, and some decontamination methods can remove that charge.
Decontamination can change how a respirator fits, meaning how well a respirator can seal to the face.
You know, there’s always concern with the chemical residues and off-gassing that can create risks for the wearer.
And models also vary in materials and the components that they have, and the effects can build up over repeated cycles. So performance has to be evaluated for each specific model and each decontamination method, including after repeated treatment.
So next, I’m gonna walk us through our approach, and how we did that.
So first, we selected the FFR models, and the decontamination method. We tested N95 FFRs, including surgical N95 FFRs, and we chose models that were commonly used in healthcare or held in the strategic national stockpile.
And then from about 30 candidate decontamination methods, we used an evidence-based process to select 12.
And we did that by focusing on user safety, potential to reduce the viruses, and ease of use.
So we wanted to use standard methods to assess the respirator performance and also the decontamination efficacy.
For respirator performance, we used established standard methods to assess filtration, followed by fit. We have those in-house at NPPTL, as, you know, we work on the respirator approval program. So we had the methods to do the FFR performance.
So, for the viral efficacy, we had to develop new methods to contaminate the FFRs with viruses, and we wanted to do that by applying them as droplets and also as aerosols to mimic the common routes of exposures.
These methods eventually made it into ASTM standards, however, those standards are no longer active.
We screened each method in steps. Filtration came first, and the method had to work on all models that we tested to move on to fit testing. Methods that preserved filtration and fit for repeated cycles were then tested against H1N1 influenza virus. And so, what did we find?
So this table shows the methods we evaluated and their filtration fit and viral cycle results.
The method counted as passing only if it worked on every model we tested.
7 of the 12 methods did not harm filtration. Of those, ethylene oxide and household bleach were dropped because they had odors, and with the odor, we were concerned that it could pose a risk to the wearer.
Dry heat, worked for filtration, but it lost fit after 3 cycles.
So that left us with four methods that preserve both fit and filtration, which were Vaporized hydrogen peroxide, ultraviolet germicidal radiation, microwave-generated steam, and moist heat.
The last three also achieved a 99.99% reduction in H1N1 influenza.
Vaporized hydrogen peroxide was not tested against virus, but an FDA-sponsored study of FFR decontamination found it effective against bacterial spores.
One key finding is we noticed that the effects were model-specific.
And so…
this is kind of where we had to leave it. We had identified these promising methods, and, you know, we had the established standards to test them.
But here we had to pause the work and change our direction.
And so around 2011, we ran into major regulatory and implementation barriers to FFR decontamination.
So we started to examine other ways to conserve supplies, and specifically, we looked at extended use, or wearing the same FFR for multiple patient encounters.
And limited reuse, which is donning and doffing the same FFR for each patient encounter.
And then to evaluate these practices, we assessed how repeated donning effects fit, how contamination transfer from FFRs to hands, how contamination accumulates on FFRs and surgical masks during influenza season in clinical settings.
And all this work could be its own presentation, but one of the things you may be familiar with
One of our findings is that respirators can be donned up to 5 times without a significant loss of fit. This became the basis of our recommendation to limit FFR reuse to 5 donnings, and we completed this research in 2015.
Now, we still had some unanswered questions, and during COVID-19, we were given the chance to evaluate extended use and reuse in clinical settings. From April 2021 through July 2022, we followed 412 healthcare workers practicing extended use and reuse at 6 emergency departments.
And what we found was nearly 40% of the respirators failed the fit test just after one shift of use. And we also found that filtration also declined, with use.
Again, these outcomes were model-specific, which is very important to some of our recommendations.
And these studies mattered because they let us assess the utility of decontamination by giving some evidence of how well FFRs perform over time without the use of decontamination, which is… which will never restore fit or filtration.
Together this work shows how respirators perform with and without decontamination, and it shapes lessons I’ll share next.
So to return to our opening question, can disposable respirators be safely decontaminated for reuse? For some methods and for some models, that answer is yes.
Some decontamination methods reduce pathogen burden while preserving fit and filtration, but really those outcomes are,
are dependent on the method and the model tested, the FFR model tested.
The ability to safely extend use or reuse of an FFR is model-specific as well, and fit and filtration can decline with repeated use and repeated donnings.
And under these conditions, FFRs have a finite usable life, and as the limit is reached, the added value of decontamination may be limited.
And that ends my presentation. Here’s my contact information. If you have any questions, you can reach me at that email address provided, and I want to thank you for your time and attention.
Ugh.
Angela Weber 15:32
Thank you very much, Ed. That was a great presentation. I know from working during COVID, the really important role your lab played in sharing that information and conducting research in very quick timeframes, turnarounds.
Okay, so our next presenter…
Is Dr. Selcen Hillja, and she is a Senior Research Engineer and works also in NIOSH’s National Personal Protective Technology Lab.
Her work has focused on protective clothing research, testing and evaluation, standards development, and response efforts for public health emergencies, including avian influenza, Ebola, and COVID-19.
Floor is yours, Selcen.
Selcen Kilinc-Balci 16:22
Thank you, Angela.
Thank you for inviting me to participate in this webinar. Let me begin with a practical question. During a PPE shortage, if we wipe a protective garment and it looks clean, can we assume it still provides the same level of protection?
Our studies suggest that we should be cautious about making that assumption. A wipe may remove visible contamination, but it may also affect the garment’s liquid barrier performance.
Today, I’ll discuss what we learned about disinfecting wipes and protective clothing, why the findings matter for worker protection, and why they may mean, what they mean for PPE decontamination and reuse decisions.
During outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics, PPE demand can quickly exceed available supplies.
Organizations may then consider extended use, limited reuse, or disinfecting wipes for localized cleaning. Wiping may help remove visible contamination and support safer handling during dothing, particularly when changing protective clothing is not feasible. However, a garment can look clean and intact.
while its barrier performance has changed. The difference between appearance and measured performance is the reason for this study. We wanted to understand whether wiping could affect the ability of protective clothing to resist liquid penetration.
To investigate this question, we conducted a controlled laboratory study involving 9 protective clothing models.
The models included surgical and isolation gowns with different AAMI PB70 barrier claims, gowns without barrier claims, and two commonly used coveralls.
We evaluated two quaternary ammonium disinfecting wipes. One contained approximately 55% alcohol, and the other did not contain any alcohol.
For each model, we evaluated 10 samples under 3 conditions.
An unwipe control, a sample tested immediately after wiping, and a sample tested after wiping and drying. They measured two outcomes, hydrostatic resistance and impact penetration. hydrostatic resistance measure how well a material resists water penetration under increasing pressure.
Impact penetration measures, resistance to liquid delivered as a spray or impact.
Lower liquid penetration values indicate better performance.
Let’s look at the main findings. The most important observation was that the effect of wiping varied considerably depending on the material construction. The values shown here are hydrostatic resistance results before drying.
Several materials showed a substantial reduction after wiping.
For example, the medium-weight spunbond-meltblown-spunbond, in short, SMS material decreased from approximately 30 centimeters of water in the unwiped condition to approximately 3 to 4 centimeters after wiping, meaning almost no penetration resistance at all
The heavyweight SMS material showed a similar pattern.
Decreasing from approximately 68 centimeters to 3 to 4 centimeters. The flashspun material, which is used in the construction of commonly used coveralls, also showed a large decrease from 105cm to about 6 centimeters.
The coated flashspun material started with a higher resistance, 485cm, but also showed a substantial reduction after wiping. Other materials responded differently.
The laminated material and polyreinforced SMS material were all… were comparatively more stable in this part of the study. The SF SMS material, which includes a film layer between spermbound and SMS layers, showed a more complex response that depended on the white chemistry.
The practical message is that white performance cannot be predicted from the appearance of the garment or from results for another fabric.
We also measured the impact penetration, and the most noticeable increases occurred in the SMS fabrics.
A natural question is whether drying restores the original barrier for hormones.
The results show that drying should not automatically be considered a recovery step.
For spun-bound film SMS material, the unwipe hydrostatic resistance was approximately 359 centimeters.
After wiping with the non-alcohol wipe, resistance decreased to 222cm before drying, which is a significant change. After drying, it decreased further to approximately 134 centimeters. For the flashspun materials, drying improved resistance compared to the immediately wipe condition in some cases.
However, performance generally did not return to the original unwipe baseline.
This means that allowing a garment to dry does not guarantee that its original protective performance has returned. Drying needs to be evaluated as part of the specific cleaning and reuse process.
There are 3 practical takeaways from this work. First.
Disinfecting wipes can be associated with reduced liquid resistance in some protective clothing materials. Second.
The result depends on both material and the drying condition. Third, decisions about the wipe-based decontamination and PPE reuse require evidence for the specific PPE, the specific wipe, and specific process.
This does not mean that wiping is never appropriate. It means that wiping should be treated as part of the exposure control process and evaluated accordingly. The goal is to reduce contamination while maintaining the protective function of the garment.
As with any laboratory study, there are limitations. We evaluated a limited number of protective clothing models and two-wipe chemistries only. These products do not represent the entire market.
We also did not evaluate repeated wiping, even though repeated wipe times may occur during extended use or prolonged emergency response.
Another important point is that decontamination efficacy and barrier performance are
Separate questions. A wipe may reduce contamination, but we also need to know whether it changes the ability of the PPE to protect the wearer.
Future research should be… should be including Additional white chemistries, including Bleach-based and hydrogen peroxide-based wipes.
We’ll also need to study repeated wiping, decontamination efficacy, and the effect of wiping on reusable equipment such as PAPR hoods, and we already collected some data on PAPR hoods.
So, what should organizations take away from this work? The bottom line is that we should not assume compatibility between disinfecting wipes and protective clothing. Wipe chemistry and fabric construction can interact.
A wipe that is appropriate for one product may not be appropriate for another.
Before implementing a wipe-based cleaning or reuse procedure, organizations should consult the protected clothing manufacturer and determine whether the specific wipe has been evaluated with the specific PPE. A complete procedure should define the PPE model, wipe product, wiping method.
Number of cycles, drying conditions, and the criteria for reuse or disposal.
When the highest level of protection is needed, replacements may be more appropriate unless the reuse process has been validated. And perhaps.
The most important lesson is preparedness. The best time to make these decisions is before an emergency, when there is time to evaluate the process carefully.
My contact information was added on this slide, and can also be found… used for questions about this work or related research.
And thank you very much for your attention and the opportunity to share this work. The practical lesson is straightforward. Cleaning PPE is only successful if the process reduces contamination while preserving protection. That is the connection to clean. We build confidence through evidence.
increase awareness of hidden risks, reduce exposure, and identify the next research questions before the next emergency. And I look forward to the discussion. Thank you.
Angela Weber 25:39
Great. Thank you, Selcen. We’re now going to switch from discussing decontamination of PPE onto the decontamination of the built environment.
Our next speaker is Bryon Marsh. Bryon is the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Program Developmental and Technical Relationship Manager for the Savannah River National Laboratory. Bryon.
Bryon Marsh 26:06
Thank you for the introduction, Angela, and good evening to the U.S. colleagues, and good… or good morning to our international colleagues. So, Brent.
Glad you could make it this early.
I’m going to discuss, radiological hazards, contamination, and refer it back to PPE. My comments,
If there’s any attributions over what I’m presenting,
These do not reflect upon the U.S. Department of Energy or Sound River National Lab. This is my personal take, in support of IBEC.
So, next slide, please.
In the U.S, we have a lot of history, on radiological contamination.
So we have a case study here that I’ll discuss quickly, but if you consider our national labs and, our Cold War effort for
Building out our nuclear inventory. We’re still cleaning up, radiological contamination every day, and that work will not end soon.
So, a lot of the information that I have here is based on Radworker,
Knowledge that has been developed in a lot of the cleanup sites where we have health, physics technicians, working 5 days a week, 40 hours a week, cleaning up contamination.
In this case, University of Washington Harborview Training and Research Facility back in 2019, an unintentional event occurred where, cesium-137 was released in a recovery operation.
Why this is important is it demonstrates the ability, for cesium-137 in a powder form
to quickly, aerosolize and move throughout a building and create a massive contamination event, mainly inside the building, but the material also went outside of the building envelope. It wasn’t gross contamination outside of the building.
But, contamination was detected outside of the building. Part of that, was related to how, this particular… how this, cesium-137 moved within the built environment.
Air handling systems were identified quickly, and they were turned off in the early part of the response, but what wasn’t well understood was how the contamination moved within the wall.
and the actual building structure. So there’s a link down there for a case study from the Department of Energy, and that’s a good one to review.
Next slide, please.
So things, to consider about radiological contamination. It’s difficult to detect if you do not have the right detection equipment.
So often, we’re concerned about radiation as an exposure, and in this case, radiological contamination is usually not an exposure
hazard. It’s an internal uptake, so through ingestion, inhalation, through a wound, that’s where contamination becomes a problem when we have an uptake.
So…
If we have, what’s referred to as a pancake probe, or the right equipment that reads out and counts versus
a dose rate, that’s how we detect contamination. So, oftentimes, we have the response community doesn’t have the right equipment, to go out and detect contamination.
Some forms of radiologic material are easier to disperse than others. So, for example, cesium-137 can often be found in a powder form or in a ceramic that’s easily aerosolized or used in an RDD for dispersal, where it will aerosolize. But oftentimes, in industry, we see radiologic material
That’s a… that’s a metal, and that’s more difficult, to create a contamination event. Even in an RDD, you’ll have fragmentation of that metal versus an aerosolized hazard.
PPE strategy is to prevent internalization, not to prevent exposure. So there are no lead-based PPE ensembles that we can wear. That’s, when we deal with contamination, we want to make sure we’ve got,
prevent it from ventilation, as well as getting onto our skin and into our pores. Decontamination consists of removal, not neutralization. So, we can’t take bleach and neutralize radiologic contamination. It must be physically removed, and we’ll talk a little bit more
About, what those techniques are in the next slide.
And then frisking, which is an industry term, requires the right detection equipment, and it is an essential method to control contamination.
Oftentimes, when we had a,
a large amount of material that’s emitting radiation, it’s difficult to determine, that you have removable contamination that can transfer from one surface to another, because the
A larger amount of radiation will overwhelm the detector, so what you have to do is take a swipe, a physical sample of a surface, go back to what we refer to as background, and then check to see if any contamination was on that swipe.
Next slide, please.
Things to consider, again, are, contamination is usually not a dose rate problem, right? So, I’ll… it’s, it’s an inhalation, or an uptake problem.
Doffing PPE usually removes contamination, even
If the public has been exposed, we can consider 80-90% of contamination will be removed just by doffing their clothes. We can consider usually up to 100% removal if PPE was worn correctly and we did not have a breach in the ensemble.
We usually consider 100% removal just by taking off our PPE.
Strategy for Contamination on skin.
So we remove the PPE, and then we, use our detectors to do the frisking to see if there’s any detectable contamination on the skin using a counts first dose rate, probe.
And if we find contamination has made it onto the skin, and oftentimes that might be around the fingers, or around the face when we take off a mask.
We’ll use, a wet wipe.
We’ll measure to see if any material has been removed, and we’ll keep repeating that process until we’re not detecting anything on our wipe to see if that contamination has been removed.
If we need to get more complicated, and we have material that’s been, uptaked into the spores, we can use a tape brush or a soft brush.
And we might even use a luke, warm water, soap and water solution. And if that doesn’t work, oftentimes using a piece of, plastic, like a plastic, or a,
A glove over a hand to induce sweating and opening of the pores sometimes will work.
But if decontamination efforts on skin fail in the field, it’s now a medical issue, and it’s time to transport to a medical facility. So understanding when you’ve reached that point is really important for our responder community.
So, we wrap the affected area to reduce contamination spread, and we make sure we have contact with the receiving facility before we transport, so that they can get ready. And oftentimes, sending somebody with a detector that has a little background
And, radiological control is a good idea just to interface, with the medical staff.
Next slide.
So, a good document to look at in terms of planning, each scenario, response scenario is different.
So the indoor, event could be different than an outdoor event, or an industrial accident could be different than an intentional
terrorist event, but I think there’s still a lot to be found in this document. It’s the planning guidance for the first 100 minutes, post-RDD detonation. And the science behind this document, occurred with collaboration between the U.S.
Canada, Great Britain, and the Israelis. And we did years of research, and then we
Put all the lessons learned into a guidance document.
For, jurisdictional planning. So, there are tactics for the guys that are on the ground, and you can see that that’s represented in the, in the blue, section of the graph, and then there are, missions for emergency managers, such as,
public messaging, what to do in terms of shelter in place, or standing up.
a center for people that are going to evacuate. So the tactics cover detection out in the field, and one of the tactics is measure and map, and so getting ground truth data, say 10 points of data, into a transport model is really important, because we can accurize
Or, transport model, and provide an overlay, to your,
Incident commanders so that they have now a better idea of where the contamination is and guidance on what to do with the measurement levels.
So, that concludes my, presentation. I don’t think I put any contact information
My, email address is Bryan.marsh, B-R-Y-O-N-M-A-R-S-H, at srnl. G-O-V, and my phone number is 404-660-8917.
And Angela, that’s all I got. So I’m turning it back over to you.
Angela Weber 36:24
All right, thank you very much. I think we’re switching over to Brett, who will moderate the next speakers.
Brett Cole 36:36
Thank you, Bryon.
Thank you, Bryon. Our next presenter is Ken Martinez, who is president and co-founder of IBEC. And so, Ken, I’ll just pass it over to you.
Kenneth Martinez 36:57
Thank you. Hopefully everybody can see my slides okay. Again, I am the president of IBEC. I was one of the original members of the organization. We are a non-profit, as I mentioned before, and before I served as president for the past 2 years, I was the chief science officer.
But, you know, going back…
Angela Weber 37:15
That’s true.
Kenneth Martinez 37:16
Yeah.
Angela Weber 37:16
Excuse me, we are not… at least I am not seeing your slides.
Kenneth Martinez 37:20
Okay.
Why me?
Let’s try again. Share.
Microsoft PowerPoint.
Sure.
Anything?
Angela Weber 37:34
Not yet.
It’s working on it, it looks like.
Kenneth Martinez 37:51
I think, Brett, you may have my slides, too, because I submitted them, so it may be come down to you sharing.
Yeah, it’s not working, it should be up already.
Try one more time, a different way.
Desktop…
Anything?
No, it says participants can now see my screen, so can you see it?
Angela Weber 38:23
I do not. I see a grayed-out screen.
Kenneth Martinez 38:30
Okay, my apologies to the audience. I had it working before.
Brett, do you have my slides?
Or Angie, one of the two. I sent them to everybody.
Thank you, Brad, that’ll work.
Angela Weber 39:00
I’m into presentation mode, Brett?
Kenneth Martinez 39:20
Thank you, Brett. Perfect, perfect.
So, once again, I myself spent 33 years with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. I retired from the Public Health Service back in 2010. I then served 3 years as the field team lead for the NIOSH nanotechnology team.
My… I’m an environmental engineer, but I’m also a certified industrial hygienist. My role with NIOSH for those 30 years was to focus on biological agents. My career was built on that.
At first, it started off with, assessment of control technologies in the fermentation industry, and then it segued into indoor air quality assessment. So, I did a lot of mold work. I understand characterization of mold in contaminated built environments, and also how to remediate that mold contamination.
Next slide, please.
Okay.
So how did things change?
This is a story I love to tell. So, back…
with the AMI building, the American Media Building, I remember watching the news, and…
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, was talking about, during a press conference, talking about this contamination that occurred in the AMI building, but he made this critical comment. We do not believe it is bioterrorism.
Okay, so I thought to myself, interesting, and this was… this was the Friday before Columbus Day.
I…
was… thought to myself, well, I focused my whole capabilities on mold, but I knew a little bit about zoonotic diseases, and I thought, where are the cattle?
In Boca Raton, Florida.
Well, on Columbus Day, I got a call from a colleague, a doctor that I work with in NIOSH, and he said, Ken, we’re all sitting around the table, talking about this anthrax case, and he said, how would you sample for anthrax spores? And I said, well.
I’ve never done that before, but I figured it’s a spore, and I’ve sampled for fungal spores, so I would use these methodologies, both airborne and surface, that included wipes, swabs, and vacuum.
And I was bound on a plane for Boca Raton within 4 hours. And I coordinated all of the environmental investigations for all of the anthrax-contaminated buildings. So this all started in October 3rd, 2001.
And you’re going to see some similarities between what Bryon had described in the radiological realm and what we do here. The difference being, the critical difference is we did not have detection systems that were as reliable as what they see in radiation.
Next slide, please.
So, the anthrax spores for review. It’s a bacterium. It is aerobic, it is non-motile, and it’s gram-positive. They can range in size for the endospores from 1 to 5 micrometers, which means they’re respirable. They are extremely resistant to environmental extremes, meaning heat and dryness.
And they are also electrostatic. Now, I say that with a question mark, because that was never really proven.
the letters that you see in the middle, in the middle of the slide, is one was to Senator Leahy, and one was to Senator Daschle.
We estimate that they contain 1-2 grams of purified spores. Now, 1 gram is approximately 1 times 10 to the 12th spores, so 2 grams would be an equivalent of 2 million doses.
Next slide, please.
So, responding to this event was complicated, because we have limited laboratory capacity. This all focused on the laboratory response network that CDC helped to oversee.
But we were getting… they were getting requests for clinical sample analysis, for forensic analysis from the FBI, but also for environmental analysis from
myself and my team, which we were limited on how many samples we could collect, and that usually was 40 samples per day. Next slide, please.
But the bottom line is, there were no numeric criteria for interpreting the environmental measurements. How much is too much on a surface? How do we characterize what’s in the air? And when it came down to the remediation component, the criteria that was used on Capitol Hill, they established the first
Set of criteria for clearance, which was zero growth.
on culture for collected samples. That means swabs, wipes, and vacuum, zero growth on culture. Next slide.
So there are different phases of a response for biological agents. Screening, characterization, but I’m going to focus on the remediation and restoration component. But just to talk briefly, screening helps us to understand
that law enforcement and public health partnership, which was strained in the beginning, when we were addressing the issue in the American Media Building.
The analysis is confined to validated methods that we know can prove that we have, beyond a shadow of a doubt, anthrax. And the sampling approach is very targeted. Now, characterization can be
more widespread. It is a federal and industry partnership. The analysis can be more flexible, which we move from culturable methods to PCR identification. And our
Sampling approach became more statistical, probabilistic.
But with remediation and restoration, again, that same federal and industry partnership, because the industries were the ones that had the contaminated buildings, and the analysis focused back to,
validated methods that had to be used. But we were able to take some targeted approach, or a probabilistic approach, with sampling, because the level of contamination was so broad, we had to make sure that it was statistically valid and gave us confidence in the estimate of the cleaning methods. Next slide, please.
So, this is just a focus of a summary of everything that was done, as far as the anthrax-contaminated buildings. What exactly was remediated? In total, there were 5 buildings. This included the American Media Building, this included the Joseph Curseen Jr. and Thomas Morris Jr. Processing and Distribution Center, or
Yeah, the PDC in, Baltimore. This included the Trenton Processing and Distribution Center. This was believed to be where the letters all entered into and were disseminated. There was also the,
On Anacostia, the, male… it was a… it was a Mail Annex room in this huge warehouse on Anacostia Naval Base.
And then, I’m trying to think of what the fifth building was, but the rooms and structures that were decontaminated included, a mailroom in the Supreme Court building, a mailroom in the…
State Department building.
But the decontamination strategies or approaches that we took varied by the level of contamination. For something the size of the American Media Building.
And the Daschle Suite, that was the other building I couldn’t think of.
We use vaporized hydrogen… vaporo… no, chlorine dioxide.
Now, I’m sure some of you will have questions with regard to the… it is a very,
Sensitive material, what’s the word I’m looking for? It has its health risks, and how do we contain that?
For other buildings, such as the, State Department mailroom and this Anacostia Mail Annex, vaporized hydrogen peroxide was used.
VHP had to be compartmentalized, meaning that we approached it in sections of decontamination. Chlorine dioxide, however, was a building-wide infusion of chlorine dioxide gas at the right concentration and time value to successfully kill all spores that were in the building.
In both these cases, the technologies were applied through a contractor. Now, for rooms or structures, we use two different approaches. Bleach is effective against anthrax spores in a 10% dilution.
We also use Sandia Foam.
The cost was phenomenal. For all of these decontaminations of buildings and rooms, it ranged up to hundreds of millions of dollars. This was actually published by Dorothy Cantor, who was then with EPA, and I’ve got the citation down there on the lower right.
For the two processing distribution systems.
used by the Postal Service, it was estimated to have cost about $200 million to disinfect or decontaminate these two buildings. And these cost estimates do not include the business continuity costs and the cost of renovation.
Of these 5 facilities, of these 5 facilities.
Of these 5 facilities, they were closed for over a 2-year period. Next slide, please.
So how does this apply to our current world? Well, given that time, we’ve seen the amerithrax, which are the anthrax spores.
SARS required some level of decontamination. The extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB) case that many of you may remember, the gentleman that came from Europe and kind of snuck into the country from Canada, and was eventually identified, and we… he was housed in the Atlanta hospital area, and CDC responded to that. Ricin.
but also H1N1, Ebola, which we’re living through right here and now, and COVID-19, which is still problematic.
So, decontamination and characterization of the efficacy of that decontamination became something that was real and we had to rely on time and time again. Next slide, please.
Ultimately, it’s all about the risk, and risk assessment has to do with identifying what the hazard is.
what is that dose-response relationship? Because sometimes we don’t really have that. We estimated for the anthrax spores, it was somewhere between 8,000 and 50,000 spores for the infectious dose of 50% of the population exposed.
exposure characterization, I talked about that earlier. With, you know, with radiation, we have these solid detection systems. We don’t have solid detection systems for exposure characterization for biological ages. We can do it, and we have done it successfully, and we can interpret that data, but it comes down to statistical power.
Once we have all these three elements, then we can provide a risk characterization. You cannot use indoor air quality metrics to define what an exposure may be, which was suggested for COVID-19.
You have to focus on the organism and its survivability. So, it’s important to take a holistic strategy to reduce the risk. We do that through defined metrics and understanding what the exposure limit guidelines are.
Medical interventions are incredibly, critically important in being part of that strategy. Environmental mitigation strategies, this is the component that IBEC puts itself front and center on.
But we also have to understand the social behaviors, because we have to communicate to those potentially exposed.
what it means.
what they can do to protect themselves moving forward. So, this is really interdisciplinary team that needs to
come up with an appropriate risk strategy. And I believe that’s my last slide. I didn’t have a slide for my contact information, but, you can send it to Ken M, that is K-E-N-M, at weareibec.org.
dot org.
Thanks, Angie.
Angela Weber 50:58
Thanks, Ken.
That brings back a lot of memories, by the way.
Kenneth Martinez 51:03
Hello.
Angela Weber 51:04
Okay, so we’re going to, thanks to every… all of our presenters, and so far, we’re now going to transition to a moderated Q&A, part of it.
seminar. I’ll be asking each panelist one pre-submitted question to kick things off, and then we’ll open the floor for audience questions submitted in the chat room. So.
If anyone in the audience has, any questions, you can start placing them in there. Speakers, you’re welcome to answer in the chat, and we’ll do our best. If we don’t get to people’s questions during today’s seminar, we’ll follow up.
At a later time.
So… Let’s get started with the NIOSH presenters first.
You know, in listening to both of your presentations, it’s clear the lessons learned since COVID
Our… the biggest challenge remains around resource scarcity.
When supply chains are ineffective for a whole number of possible reasons.
Ed, considering this, how… Should filtering facepiece respirator decontamination fit within a broader strategy?
To conserve respirator supplies, and prepare stockpiles for future emergencies.
Edward Fisher 52:22
It’s a good question, and very important now, that we’re transitioning from the, kind of like the…
Strategic national stockpile to more, territorial jurisdictions, and
So I think, if you look at this, you kind of have to look back, or look at how CDC organizes its strategies right now, for conserving N95s.
There’s 3 tiers, and those tiers escalate as the shortage gets worse. There’s conventional contingency and crisis measures.
So conventional measures…
kind of cover everyday practices like training and fit testing, but it also includes, strategies that focus on making supplies go further. And one of those would be using NIOSH-approved elastomeric respirators, which are reusable devices, so that would help.
and maintaining, supplies. If shortages are anticipated.
Then you start working into the contingency measures,
And that, you have things like prioritizing FFRs for specific tasks.
or implementing extended use, which I discussed, during my presentation. And then you have the crisis level, where there are known shortages,
There, you can use limited reuse up to 5 donnings, and decontamination would fit into that crisis level. That’s how it was implemented during COVID.
But it’s no longer part of those strategies, and
you know, I don’t know if that would be something that would change in the future, but currently, it’s not there. And so…
you know, if you go back and think what we did during COVID, our first recommendation for decontamination, that was based on our reusability study, and it was,
It actually came about because we saw that healthcare facilities were already deploying some of those methods, and we found that they were deploying the ones that we knew that didn’t work. So it was more about getting the message out about what didn’t work.
you know, along with what we identified in our research, is promising. So, for example, they were using isopropyl alcohol, and we knew that that knocked off the electrostatic charge.
And so that’s kind of how we put out those first decontamination recommendations. We did follow that up with a second one where we promoted a more passive approach, and that was the one where we store respirators in breathable containers between uses, and that just allows time for viruses to die off.
And if you think about it, that’s just really a form of reuse, which is still in the CDC’s crisis capacity strategy.
But moving forward, I think planners should also consider NIOSH-approved reusable alternatives, like elastomerics and PAPRs, to add to their stockpiles based on their needs.
Their capabilities, for… I’m sorry, and their capabilities for reprocessing, reusable devices.
Angela Weber 55:33
Okay, thank you. The next question I have here is for Selcen.
You mentioned powered air purifying respirators as a future research priority.
This seems especially important when considering the supply chain issues for disposable filtering facepiece respirators.
How will your work on protective clothing extend to PAPRs, since it’s a different material?
Selcen Kilinc-Balci 55:59
Thank you, Angie. The protective clothing study focused on gowns and coveralls, and the paperwork extends the question to reusable hood materials and construction features, including seams and continuous material regions.
It also examines several wipe products, including water wipe, and the goal is to determine whether cleaning affects the PAPR hood
performance, barrier performance, in a way that could influence the use decisions, as this is a common practice for
Pepperwoods. And this study is… the data collection for this study is completed now, and the data analysis as well, but the manuscript is not published yet, so I cannot share the results. But what I… what I can tell you is, though, that
I suggest all of the end users to check the manufacturer’s cleaning instructions and, you know, contacting the manufacturer if there is any compatibility with the wipe and wiping technique.
Thank you.
Angela Weber 57:07
Brett, I think you have the next questions.
Brett Cole 57:10
Yeah, thank you, Angie.
Let’s… let’s turn our attention to the decontamination of the built environment now. This question is for Bryon. What are the main concerns associated with radiological decontamination during a large indoor event involving the public?
Bryon Marsh 57:34
Thank you, Brett. I think…
Anything concerning the public, public messaging is going to be essential, and getting that right isn’t always easy.
the public, because of the, Cold War, has been… Connected to,
Radiological issues as, something that’s extremely bad.
But people that work are… are RAD workers,
Find it a lot easier to work with than, say, a chemical or biological hazard.
So knowledge and presenting, factual information early on in a response is key.
I also think, the… other…
Consideration for large public, events.
Is understanding.
Where the material is and where it’s going. And, being able to, look at the potential for re-aerosolization,
and unintended contamination transfer with the public. So if you consider the U.S. as highly mobile, where everybody has access to public transport, or has their own vehicle.
and you have a public event, people are going to go not only to the hospitals that you direct them to go to, or the emergency centers where you direct them to go to, they’re going to go to every available resource within the region that they can drive to.
And when that occurs, what you have are, hundreds, if not thousands, of vehicles, depending on the scale of event, that now are contamination that’s potentially transported outside of the affected area. And so those are some of the lessons that we’ve learned.
With just contamination in general.
Hope that answers the question.
Brett Cole 59:31
Yeah, that’s great, Bryon. Thanks very much. I’ll just, got a question for you, Ken.
Along the same lines of this thread, chlorine dioxide and hydrogen peroxide are quite toxic. How do the fumigators maintain safety outside the building during a fumigation?
Kenneth Martinez 59:52
simple, it’s just negative pressure, ensuring that they had that containment through negative pressure. And recognizing what the toxicity was from the get-go, that helps you to plan an appropriate strategy to design to ensure containment. They also had some monitors for the chlorine dioxide outside outside, so they could understand if anything was, in fact, leaking out.
So, but, it was a very well-controlled environment with these big buildings. Sensors located throughout the building to understand the concentration at different locations at the time, because that was critical to determine if they got an efficacy of kill.
So I, myself, when I was on Capitol Hill, questioned that, ability to control it, but I was very…
impressed with how successful they were. And again, it was used in multiple venues, this whole building contamination. Now, having said that, the company that did these chlorine dioxide decontaminations, they kind of progressed in their technology later by tenting a building.
For… they actually tried, methylene bromide for a home that was fungally contaminated, and they tended a hospital in California.
And it was amazing how they were able to do that.
Brett Cole 1:01:05
Yeah, I think it’s certainly come a long way, since then, Ken, and, I think the technology and also monitoring’s, improved somewhat, but, certainly those technologies have gone onto commercial applications within even our space, where we work in laboratories and BSL3 and 4, which,
are important. I’ll now hand back over to Angela for a series of questions.
Angela Weber 1:01:28
Yeah, so I have one question in the chat here. I think this would be best directed to Ken, and Bryon, you may have something to add. The question is, do we have any options for Decon building-wide
applied via HVAC system for a biological event, whether that’s virus or the enterasis Force.
Kenneth Martinez 1:01:51
That’s a great question, and actually, that was pretty much how we distributed, or how the contractor distributed the chlorine dioxide throughout a building, was through access to the ventilation system, and turning it on and getting it to circulate air and move it around.
We did some research, with,
the Canadians back in 2004, I believe, that we published a paper on, where we actually used a building that, was no longer in operation, but it was an office building, and it was still operational, so we energized the ventilation system. We had an individual there who was in Tyvek’s
suit, open a letter that contained Bacillus atrophaeus spores. And so we could actually characterize what was being released by that action, and we also characterized how it was being distributed through the ventilation system. So yes, in answer to your question, a ventilation system, in my opinion, is a very reliable way to disseminate materials.
for decontamination.
Angela Weber 1:02:50
Yeah, and Bryon, I know you have done similar work. The question is for bio. I know your presentation was for RAD, but did you want to add anything?
Bryon Marsh 1:02:59
Yeah, so if, our colleagues are interested, you can online do a research or a search for
The BioResponse Operational Testing and Evaluation Project, also known as BOT. So, Angela, I know you were involved with this, but,
EPA, the Environmental Protection Agency, sponsored a research project where we did whole building decontamination. And, that report is publicly available, so there may be some information on strategies for whole building decontamination, as well as the affected air handling systems.
Angela Weber 1:03:36
Yeah, thanks, Bryon. There was a question as if you could click the link in the chat for participants to see.
Yeah, and that was a good example of where EPA tented the building for the Decon procedure.
And since we have Australian colleagues on the phone, wanted to mention that
there were guests, EPA had invited.
that observed the boat exercise as well from Australia. I don’t know if that was from a health department.
Or more of the Environmental Responder agency.
Okay.
So, we’re gonna go back to some of the pre-submitted questions for now. I’ll go back to Ed.
Let’s see, does decontamination effectiveness differ
Depending on whether the pathogen contaminates the respirator.
As a wet droplet versus aerosolized particles.
And considering both routes of exposure were consideration during COVID, how was it determined whether a Decon method was suitable for
A specific filtering facepiece model.
And looking and taking into consideration both of those exposure routes.
Edward Fisher 1:04:56
So yeah, the… to answer the first part, and specifically for FFRs.
It can, but there’s no single rule. I think there’s studies that show that, you know, sometimes droplets may be harder to decontaminate, and…
or the aerosol particles are harder to decontaminate after deposition on the FFR.
But it depends on, you know, the decontamination method, the type of pathogen, and the FFR model.
You know, the big thing is those droplets and aerosol particles differ in size, moisture, and the fluid that they carry, and that basically changes where the pathogen ends up and how well it’s shielded.
Larger droplets tend to be captured on the outer layer, and that may be even more true with the surgical N95s that have, like, the outer fluid shield technology on them.
While the smaller particles, can reach the inner filtering layer, and again, that varies by model. And so, the method also matters, too. We did some work with the UV Decon, and
you know, the intensity of the light gets weaker as it passes through the layers, so the inner filtering layers are getting a lower dose. Again, that varies from model to model. You can have significant different results if you apply the challenge as a droplet or as an aerosol.
We saw kind of, like, the same thing with antimicrobial respirators.
Some of the antimicrobial respirators have the agents in the outer layer, some of them have them in the filtering layer, so where the agent can reach the virus depends on where the microbial challenge is actually being trapped within the respirator.
And the other thing we saw with…
We could… we’re not sure about it, but with the antimicrobial respirators, it seems that moisture was important to kind of promote the interaction between the antimicrobial agent and the targeted pathogen.
And so, there, again, you can have different results, whether you applied it as a droplet or droplet nuclei.
So, you know, we, in our study, tried to… we built two methods and had two standards, one for aerosol and one for droplets, and we thought that that was important moving forward. I’m not sure that during COVID, that both… both routes of exposure were being assessed for these FFR Decon.
Angela Weber 1:07:26
Thank you, and I meant to ask Selcen, Brett, if you can pick up with Ken after Selcen, but…
The question for you, Selcen, is that your slides had mentioned that wiping was found to impact the hydrostatic resistance of the dark.
Did it also affect the ability of the coverall to prevent exposure from sprays or splashes?
Selcen Kilinc-Balci 1:07:51
That’s a really good question. We measured two things, both hydrostatic resistance and impact penetration, and I showed hydrostatic resistance on the slides because it is the clearest picture, but impact penetration told a similar story.
Impact penetration is the splash or spray test. It measures how much water gets through the
fabric when it is, hit with a spray, so…
It is closer to a splash exposure than hydrostatic resistance, which is a pressure pulled… which is pressure pulled from pulled fluid.
In the SMS spun-bound, multiple spun-bound gowns, the amount of water passing through went up significantly after wiping. For the medium-made SMS, it went from
about 5 grams to about 21 grams for both wipes. So it means that, you know, like, fabric was penetrating only 5 grams before it was wiped, but it went up to 21 grams all of a sudden. And for heavyweight SMS, was… it was… the result was more striking. It started about 0.06 grams.
almost no water is getting through, and rolls to roughly 18 to 22 grams after wiping. For
Other materials, impact penetration values were generally zero or near zero before drying, and white-related effects were less consistent. Drying changed impact penetration for some materials, including the microporous films and coated flash span fabrics.
But the direction and magnitude varied by material and wipe chemistry.
I hope this answers your question.
Angela Weber 1:09:44
Thank you.
Brett, you wanna,
Brett Cole 1:09:48
Yeah, I can take up from there, Angie. Continuing along the microbial contamination for now, this next question’s for you, Ken.
It’s clear that whether we’re talking about PPE or different surfaces found in the built environment, there is a need to establish decontamination criteria.
For specific organisms, depending on their environmental stability.
What criteria was used to ensure that anthrax spores were inactivated and could no longer infect future building occupants? And also, who made the decision that… when it was safe to reoccupy?
And there’s also a follow-up question, from the, the, delegates, which, is, has…
UV light in HVAC systems been proven to be, useful against biological agents?
Kenneth Martinez 1:10:37
Okay, let me answer the first one.
Ask the first one again, please. Just…
Brett Cole 1:10:45
No, that’s okay. Basically, it had… who sets the criteria for what a successful decontamination is, and who then takes responsibility for re-releasing the building back to occupants for safe occupancy.
Kenneth Martinez 1:11:00
So, this was critical early on, and as I mentioned before, that this Tiger team on, when they were decontaminating the Daschle Suite, established this criteria of zero growth on culture.
So, you had to collect a series of samples, you had to streak them out onto an agar plate, Bonar for the anthrax spores, and see if it would grow up, and if you saw nothing cultural grow, then be determined that it was
Not contaminated any longer.
Was there any statistics behind this? No, but it seemed to serve the job throughout all the things that we’re doing, because again, you couldn’t use PCR, because PCR doesn’t distinguish between viability and non-viability of the spore, right? So… that’s what we use. The critical question on the back end is, okay, who clears the building?
we really couldn’t take responsibility as far as the agencies that were overseeing the decontamination. We deferred that we collected the data, we provided a report, and we gave that to the health commissioner. Then it became the health commissioner’s deter…
responsibility to say, okay, well, I’ve got evidence base here, so yes, I’m going to declare this building as safe to reoccupy.
Now, what I said things earlier about behavioral science, trying to convince people to go back in the building is a whole other issue.
With regard to the UV question, Lisa, it’s good to see your name out there. Lisa and I worked together many, many years ago.
HVAC… UV and HVAC systems is complicated, because it comes down to time and concentration. UV, if you have the right dose, and the organism is close enough to it, and it’s there long enough, UV is a very effective way to kill that organism. It’s used in wastewater treatment, it’s used in many other environments as well.
But understanding that an HVAC system is moving air.
How do you determine whether you’re getting that effective
residence time to get that appropriate kill. The other caveat to that is that, you know, quite honestly, these UV bulbs have to be replaced every 6 months, and maintenance is really not… I have not observed them staying on top of that. So that is a question that needs to be answered moving forward, and operations and maintenance that needs to be established.
Now, there is some other technologies out there, such as FAR UV, that show some promise. I actually sat as a vice chair for an ANSI committee for hospitals using UV to decontaminate hospital equipment, and we have a whole set of criteria established to try to,
Give the manufacturers, give the hospitals something to work from, as far as procedures.
But we didn’t address FAR UV, because I think it’s just nuanced right now, but you are seeing manufacturers out there, promoting that technology.
Brett Cole 1:13:46
Thanks for that, Ken. Appreciate you highlighting the importance of concentration or dose over time. It’s often forgotten in a lot of technologies, and
I appreciate you mentioning that. The next question is for Bryon. What is the main difference between biological and chemical decontamination versus radiological contamination? And are there other case studies in addition to Harborview that you would recommend for additional lessons learned?
Bryon Marsh 1:14:12
Yeah, so the first part of that question sounds simple, but there is some significant differences. I mean, we define
Radiological contamination is radiological material where you…
You don’t want it to be…
And I often use an explanation of, if you have a dog, and you have a pile in the backyard, if you can smell it, that’s the radiation. If you step on it, then your shoe is contaminated, okay? But what is contamination in terms of an actual measurement?
And that answer starts to become difficult to answer. So emergency response is different, say, than,
Returning equipment, back to home station after it’s been exposed, or, general, contamination in terms of determining that we have an elevated, measurement over background.
And again, what makes this difficult, is that we typically report in counts, per minute, and then using the efficiency, we…
turn that into disintegrations per minute. This is usually beyond what the emergency responders’ knowledge base is. We usually, if they don’t understand the efficiency, and they don’t have the ability to do that, we just use a general rule of 10% as an efficiency.
But that… that becomes very different. So emergency response is difficult. I mean, it’s different than transportation.
And also understanding the difference between aerosolized contamination
fixed contamination and removable contamination. So…
It’s… it can get very complicated in terms of working in some of these structures.
And then, a good, case study to look at, is, the Fukushima, nuclear disaster, that
I think the estimate is $13 billion U.S. in cleanup effort. Some of the lessons learned there,
is the amount of material that had to be removed and stored. That was a wicked problem that they’re still dealing with. And then, there’s some really good nuance to tracing down contamination in terms of
Of, how material came off of a roof and into a gutter and into where,
you see, the water table. So there was, some really good, things that I got out of, at looking at some of that case study.
Hope that answered the question.
Angela Weber 1:16:55
Great. Thanks, Bryon. I do see one more question. I think we have time for one more, and this would be, for Bryon. There was a question about the decontamination or replacement of HVAC.
Systems after acting as a transport system for the radioactive release.
Bryon Marsh 1:17:16
Yeah, so I’ll put the link for the Harborview response in the chat.
And you can do an HVAC search for the document. But yes, any, any aerosolized material in the right micron range, it’s going to travel, through the HVAC system. So,
The HVAC system will have to be,
most likely pulled out and replaced, based on the amount of contamination. So that, that always is going to be a consideration and something that should be addressed, quickly.
But I’ll… I’ll place that link, Into the chat.
Angela Weber 1:17:59
Thank you. Brett, do you have any closing statements? I think we’re going to turn it over to Stephane. I think this concludes our presentations and the Q&A session for today. We want to end with some updates on recent IBEC activities. Brett, do you have anything else to add?
Brett Cole 1:18:15
I just want to thank the panelists, of course, and yourself, Angie, but also, just for highlighting the complexities of some of these issues in decontamination that
there’s not one panacea for every situation and for every contaminant, and so I think it’s really important to take a scientific approach in our line of work, and all the speakers spoke about.
this in different applications, that it’s, really important to understand the effectiveness of the treatment, the dose, and how do we validate for it? So, they’re all sort of critical pieces, so I think that was one of the big takeaways I certainly obtained today, so thank you to everybody.
Stephane Bilodeau 1:18:57
So, yes, there was outstanding takeaways, Brett. Closing this, wonderful event, which outlined important topics related to decontamination, PPE, and in the built environment, I first want to greatly thank our outstanding and insightful speakers.
Selcen, Ed, Bryon, and Ken, also our big-hearted IBEC president, as well as our generous and sharp moderators, Angela and Brett. Thank you.
Second, I want to thank you very much, all attendees, for taking the time to participate with us today. With your contribution, we hope to extend a vibrant and inclusive scientific community that provides meaningful experience, but also knowledge.
We welcome you, by the way, to join us as members anytime, or to sponsor, or to contribute to our events and initiatives that will come.
I would take also the opportunity here to thank our SAB,
the Science Advisory Board members for their support and insights over the years. The SAB is composed of outstanding thought leaders from around the world.
who explore emerging trends, technologies, research gaps, while seeking opportunities for interdisciplinary collaboration. Collaboration is key here. And just so you know, that’s one of the things I wanted to mention. Whether it was at our
last, recent SAB meetings, or even during our previous LLS series event like this one, our recent discussions focused on emerging infectious diseases, pandemic preparedness, indoor air quality metrics, guidelines, avian influenza, worker safety.
Zoonotic Disease and Climate Resilience.
So, our ambition is to bridge science, policy, and practical innovation to protect communities and build a healthier, and also a more sustainable future for all.
So, if you know someone who would have liked to attend, but couldn’t be there today, the video and the transcript, also the transcript as well, will be available on our website soon. And if you have further questions to our panelists, whether,
one that wasn’t responded today because of time, or new questions that come up later, you can reach out to our great panelists, and as they have shared their contact info, but also to us, you can reach out to us, and we’ll be pleased to forward your questions to them.
So, in closing, thank you all for being part of our community, and we look forward to welcoming you to our upcoming events and initiatives.
Where you can connect with like-minded individuals and explore science and wide ranges of solution activities and opportunities. So, have a great rest of your day. Thank you.
Have a question about the event?
Connect with IBEC experts directly! Drop your queries below, and let's further the dialogue on preventing the spread of infectious diseases.
